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The uncanny aFFXUDF\RI*RG¶V mathematical 
beliefs 
 
ROBERT KNOWLES 
School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science, University 
of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK 
r.knowles@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract: I show how mathematical platonism combined with belief in 
the God of classical theism FDQDYRLG)LHOG¶VHSLVWHPRORJLFDOREMHFWLRQ,
defend an account of divine mathematical knowledge, by showing that it 
falls out of my well-motivated general account of divine knowledge. I use 
this to provide an explanation oI WKH DFFXUDF\ RI *RG¶V PDWKHPDWLFDO
beliefs, which in turn explains the accuracy of our own. My arguments 
provide good news for theistic platonists, while also shedding new light 
RQ)LHOG¶V LQIOXHQWLDOREMHFWLRQ, which should be of interest to atheistic 
philosophy of mathematics. 
 
 
 In this paper, I show how theistic platonism, mathematical 
platonism combined with belief in the God of classical theism, can respond 
WR+DUWU\)LHOG¶V 25-30) epistemological objection to mathematical 
platonism. I develop and defend a theory of divine knowledge, and show 
WKDWLWH[SODLQVWKHDFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVZKLFKLQWXUQ
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explains the accuracy of our own. I assume that divine knowledge is not 
fundamentally different from our own. In particular*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDO
EHOLHIV DUH MXVWLILHG E\ EHLQJ HQWDLOHG E\ *RG¶V V\VWHPDWLVDWLRQ RI WKH
PDWKHPDWLFDOFODLPVSUHVXSSRVHGE\*RG¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSK\VLFDO
world. This parallels mainstream contemporary platonist thought about 
human mathematical knowledge, and so provides an explanation that will 
be attractive to platonists willing to countenance the existence of God. 
Further, by showing what conditions knowledge like ours would have to 
VDWLVI\ IRU )LHOG¶V REMHFWLRQ WR EH PHW , VKHG OLJKW RQ WKLV LQfluential 
objection that should also interest atheistic philosophers of mathematics. I 
begin by presenting platonism and FiHOG¶VREMHFWLRQLQPRUHGHWDLO. 
 
 
 Platonism and its epistemological dues 
 
 Platonism is the dominant philosophy of mathematics.1 It is 
typically presented as the conjunction of three metaphysical theses: 
 
The ontological thesis: Mathematical objects (e.g. numbers, sets, 
and functions) exist. 
The independence thesis: Mathematical objects exist mind-
independently. 
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The abstractness thesis: Mathematical objects are abstract (i.e. not 
spatially located or causally active). 
 
However, I will also take platonism to entail the following epistemological 
theses: 
 
The accuracy thesis: Aside from a few mistakes, if mathematicians 
accept the mathematical proposition < p > , then < p >  is true.  
 
The explanatory thesis: Mathematical facts are explanatorily 
relevant to the physical world. To give a few prima facie compelling 
examples: I cannot share my 23 strawberries evenly between my three 
friends because there is no natural number n such that ; I keep 
failing to draw a square with the same area as a given circle, using 
only a compass and straight edge, because ʌ is transcendental.2 
Opinions differ as to the nature of the explanatory connection.3 The 
common thread is that a proper understanding of the physical world 
requires grasping certain mathematical truths. 
 
I include these because they form part of a prominent thread of 
contemporary platonist thought,4 and because it is difficult to see how 
platonism can do good philosophical work without them. Without the 
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accuracy thesis, platonism would combine scepticism about mathematical 
practice and speculation about mathematical reality, where mathematical 
practice plays no role in justifying claims about mathematical reality, and 
mathematical reality plays no role in accounting for mathematical practice. 
Without the explanatory thesis, the platonist would not easily be able to 
account for the value of mathematics. Mathematics may deal in facts, but if 
tKRVHIDFWVGRQ¶WKHOSXVXQGHUVWDQGWKHZRUOGZHLQKDELWZKDWPDNHVWKHP
worthy of our attention?5 
Against platonism, Field (1989, 25-30) raises an influential 
epistemological objection.6 In presenting it, it will help to begin with an 
analogy. On a realist view of physical science, facts about stars, planets, and 
nebulae are mind-independent. Assuming we have accurate beliefs about 
such things, the accuracy of these beliefs requires explanation, which can 
be provided by appeal to the causal relations between stars, planets, and 
nebulae and the instruments we use to detect them. On platonism, 
mathematical objects are also mind-independent (by the independence 
thesis), and we have accurate beliefs about them (by the accuracy thesis). 
This accuracy is no less in need of explanation. Yet, it seems (by the 
abstractness thesis) mathematical objects do not bear any naturalistic 
relation to the physical world that might support such an explanation. Thus, 
platonism appears to imply something in need of explanation that seems 
inexplicable, and this is a reason to reject platonism. 
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7KUHH SRLQWV RI FODULILFDWLRQ DUH LQ RUGHU )LUVW )LHOG¶V REMHFWLRQ
threatens a philosophical theory, not our mathematical beliefs. It does not 
say that our mathematical beliefs are unjustified. Some present the objection 
in terms of explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs. But 
µUHOLDELOLW\¶LVDORDGHGWHUPLQHSLVWHPRORJ\UHODWHGWRMXVWLILFDWLRQDQGLWV
use here courts misunderstanding. For example, Justin Clarke-Doane 
(2 WDNHV )LHOG¶V REMHFWLRQ WR EH WKDW RXU PDWKHPDWLFDO EHOLHIV DUH
unjustified because they are unreliable in the modal sense that they could 
HDVLO\KDYHEHHQGLIIHUHQW2QP\UHDGLQJRI)LHOGµUHOLDELOLW\¶LVQRWWREH
read modally, and the challenge dRHV QRW FRQFHUQ MXVWLILFDWLRQ )LHOG¶V
objection asks for an explanation of what is according to platonism an actual 
fact: that our beliefs about mathematical abstracta are mostly accurate. This 
correlation stands in need of explanation, even if our mathematical beliefs 
enjoy the justification we claim for them, and even if they could not easily 
have been different.7 
6HFRQG)LHOG¶VREMHFWLRQLVEHVWWKRXJKWRIDVDFKDOOHQJHUDWKHUWKDQD
knockdown argument. The abstractness thesis only explicitly precludes a 
causal explanation of the accuracy of our mathematical beliefs. According 
to platonism, there is some (non-causal) explanatory connection between 
mathematical objects and the physical world, which the platonist might 
appeal to in support of a non-causal explanation of our mathematical 
DFFXUDF\$OOWKDW)LHOGKDVWRVD\RQWKLVPDWWHULVWKDWµLWLVYHU\KDUGWR
see what this supposed non-FDXVDO H[SODQDWLRQ FRXOG EH¶ (1989, 231). 
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Nevertheless, even if a non-FDXVDO H[SODQDWLRQ LV QRW LPSRVVLEOH)LHOG¶V 
objection serves to highlight an explanatory debt that the platonist must pay. 
0HUHO\SRLQWLQJWR WKHH[SODQDWRU\WKHVLVZRQ¶WPHHW WKLVFKDOOHQJH2XU
mathematical belief-forming mechanisms are the result of causal processes, 
and even if mathematical objects are explanatorily relevant to these 
processes, it is not obvious how they could have determined the content of 
our mathematical beliefs such that they came out accurate. 
Finally, one may worry that taking platonism to entail the explanatory 
thesis begs the question against Field. A significant portion of the 
contemporary debate targets the explanatory thesis. Platonists argue that 
there are compelling examples of scientific explanations in which 
mathematics plays an explanatory role, while anti-platonists deny this. 
However, it is important to recognise that this debate primarily concerns the 
existence of a certain kind of evidence. The examples I provided above are 
controversial; but I only include them for illustrative purposes. I do not 
assume that they are compelling examples, nor that there are such examples 
to be found. I do assume that there are prima facie compelling examples, 
and that they provide prima facie defeasible evidence for the explanatory 
thesis and thus for platonism. But nominalists can agree on this. We have 
seen that the explanatory thesis forms part of a prominent thread of 
contemporary platonist thought, and that some of the philosophical work 
SODWRQLVPDVSLUHV WRGRLVGRQHE\ LW)XUWKHUPRUH)LHOG¶VREMHFWLRQVWLOO
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poses a significant challenge to platonism, even when we fold in the 
explanatory thesis. 
6HYHUDO WKHRULVWV KDYH VXJJHVWHG WKDW SODWRQLVWV FDQ PHHW )LHOG¶V
objection by adopting theism (Adams (1983, 751); Evans (2013, 121, 179-
181); Rogers (2008); Thurow (2013, 1601); Field (2001, 325)). Indeed, if 
we were created by God, then God would have ensured in creating us that 
our mathematical beliefs turned out accurate. However, Dan Baras (2017) 
has recently demurred. According to Baras, theistic platonism is committed 
to tKHQROHVVPDVVLYHDQGQRPRUHH[SOLFDEOHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ*RG¶V
mathematical beliefs and the mathematical facts. The reason is familiar. The 
independence thesis takes mathematical objects to be mind-independent, 
DQGVRLQGHSHQGHQWRI*RG¶VPLQGVRWKH DFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VEHOLHIVDERXW
them requires explanation. But the abstractness thesis seems to preclude us 
from providing any such explanation. God cannot causally interact with 
mathematical abstracta, and it is not immediately clear how the 
mathematical facts might non-FDXVDOO\ JXDUDQWHH WKH DFFXUDF\ RI *RG¶V
mathematical beliefs. Thus, Baras argues that theistic platonism merely 
pushes the problem back. 
This issue has been debated so far in the absence of a worked out theory 
of divine knowledge. To fill this gap, I will develop and defend what I call 
the understanding via acquaintance (UVA) conception of divine 
knowledge. Drawing on UVA, I will then show that, contra Baras, we can 
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H[SODLQWKHDFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVDQGWKHUHE\H[SODLQ our 
own mathematical accuracy. 
 
 Understanding via acquaintance 
 
 In this section, I present UVA and the key notions it involves. UVA 
is shaped by the assumption that divine knowledge has the following two 
properties. It is scrutable, in that it is not fundamentally different from 
human knowledge. To explain an aspect of divine knowledge, we must be 
able to have some understanding of what divine knowledge involves. 
Divine knowledge is ideal, in that it is the best possible way of making 
cognitive contact with reality, compatible with its scrutability. I now 
explicate the key notions of acquaintance and understanding. 
 
Acquaintance: Acquaintance is a relation of direct awareness between 
agents and parts of the world (e.g. physical objects, properties of physical 
objects, mental states, and facts or states of affairs). Acquaintance is direct 
in the sense that the immediate object of awareness is the object of 
acquaintance. In being acquainted with something, that thing, and not some 
mental representation of it, is the immediate object of our awareness. 
Acquaintance is not intentional: one cannot be acquainted with the non-
existent.8 
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An intuitive example of acquaintance is awareness of pain. We apply 
the concept of pain to certain experiences, rather than what those 
experiences purport to represent. Thus, my having a pain in my left foot 
LVQ¶WDPDWWHURIP\PHQWDOO\UHSUHVHQWLQJWKDW,KDYHDSDLQLQP\IRRWLW
is a matter of my being directly aware of a certain kind of experience. By 
being in pain, I perhaps mentally represent trauma in my foot; but we 
ZRXOGQ¶WQRUPDOO\LGHQWLI\WKLVWUDXPDZLWKP\SDLQ$VDUHVXOW,FDQQRW
be wrong about having a pain in my foot.9 Whether we are also acquainted 
with other things, such as physical objects, is moot. However, it will be 
useful in what follows to assume that human veridical perception of 
physical objects is a form of acquaintance, so as to provide vivid 
LOOXVWUDWLRQVRIP\DUJXPHQWV,QGRLQJVR,DPQRWVXJJHVWLQJWKDW*RG¶V
manner of being acquainted with the world is anything like visual 
perception. Presumably, one needs certain biological faculties to visually 
SHUFHLYH$QLQIRUPDWLYHDFFRXQWRI*RG¶VPHDQVRIDFTXDLQWDQFHZRXOG
go well beyond the scope of this paper. 
God is acquainted with everything with which it is possible to be 
acquainted. But why should divine knowledge be characterised in terms of 
acquaintance? Because knowledge that p that involves being directly aware 
of the fact that p is a better epistemic position with respect to <  p >  than 
knowledge that only involves being indirectly aware of the fact that p. There 
are two reasons for this. First, the object of acquaintance is guaranteed to 
exist, so if one is acquainted with the fact that p, the fact that p must obtain 
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and < p >  must be true. So, acquaintance ensures infallibility. Second, to 
EHDFTXDLQWHGZLWKDIDFWLVWRµVHHLWIRURQHVHOI¶DQGWKXVQRWWRGHSHQGRQ
DQ\WKLQJ RU DQ\RQH HOVH IRU RQH¶V FRJQLWLYH FRQWDFW ZLWK UHDOLW\ ,Q WKLV
sense, acquaintance is the ultimate manifestation of the epistemic virtue of 
intellectual autonomy (cf. Pritchard (2016)). 
 
Understanding: Understanding involves grasping the explanatory 
dependencies between things. Understanding has received most attention in 
the flourishing literature on scientific explanation, where it is taken to be 
what explanations provide (e.g. Achinstein (1983, 23); Salmon (1989, 134±
135); Kitcher (2002); Lipton (2004, 30); Woodward (2003, 179); Ylikoski 
and Kuorikoski (2010); de Regt (2017)). Understanding is also beginning 
to receive attention in general epistemology (e.g. Zagzebski (2001); 
Kvanvig (2004); Grimm (2006); Carter and Gordon (2014); Pritchard 
(2016)). The growing consensus is that having a deep understanding of 
something is to be in a particularly strong epistemic position with respect to 
it. I will illustrate with an example (inspired by Carter and Gordon (2014, 
6)). 
Suppose a house has burned down. Upon inspecting the site, a novice 
firefighter notices some faulty wiring and correctly concludes that it caused 
the fire. The firefighter knows that the faulty wiring caused the fire, and has 
a shallow understanding of why the house burned down, by grasping that 
the faulty wiring was somehow responsible. Now suppose that a leading 
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expert on exothermic chemical reactions leads an investigation, getting a 
team to study the wiring, examine photographs of the frequency spectrum 
of the flames, and so on. The scientist also knows and understands why the 
house burned down. But the amount of information in and explanatory 
FRKHUHQFH RI WKH VFLHQWLVW¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LV IDU JUHDWHU FI &DUWHU DQG
Gordon (2014, 6)). The scientist fully grasps the intricacies regarding what 
the development of the fire depended on. She grasps, for example, what 
would have to be different (in oxygen levels, wiring, insulation, etc.) for the 
fire to have unfolded differently, or for it not to have occurred at all, 
granting her the ability to make sophisticated counterfactual inferences 
DERXWWKHILUH,QFRPSDULVRQWKHILUHILJKWHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRQO\IDFLOLWDWHV
rudimentary reasoning. So we see that having a rich understanding of why 
something occurred is better epistemically speaking than merely knowing 
what is responsible for it. The ideal epistemic position should therefore 
involve having a maximally rich understanding of the facts. 
Is understanding itself a species of propositional knowledge? I think not. 
Stephen Grimm (2006) shows that human understanding of physical 
phenomena resembles propositional knowledge in two key respects. Trying 
to understand physical phenomena involves mentally representing how it 
depends on other things, and understanding is achieved only to the extent 
that the representation is accurate. Thus, human understanding of empirical 
phenomena is indirect²mediated by mental representation²and non-
transparent²we can easily be wrong about whether we have it. 
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Nevertheless, human understanding of physical phenomena need not be 
propositional. The object of our understanding is an objective explanatory 
dependence between things, and we grasp this by forming a mental 
representation that models it. But this model need not contain a 
propositional element that states that the physical phenomena depends on 
each of its determinants. An accurate causal model for physical 
phenomenon P that shows how it changes for different values of the variable 
X does not state that X causes P; yet we can grasp the explanatory 
dependence between X and P by grasping how changes in X change P. This 
need not involve grasping a further proposition. 
Other examples of human understanding diverge from propositional 
knowledge to a greater extent. For example, understanding a mathematical 
theorem involves being able to follow a (perhaps explanatory) proof of it. 
This involves grasping the propositions that comprise the proof, but also 
grasping how these propositions logically depend on one another, which is 
not a case of grasping some further proposition (cf. Zagzebski (2001, 244)). 
In such cases, our understanding seems to be both direct, because we grasp 
how the parts comprising the body of knowledge fit together by being 
acquainted with our mental representations of them, and transparent, 
because it seems at least very difficult to be wrong about whether we have 
this kind of understanding. 
Transparent and direct understanding is better, epistemically speaking, 
than indirect and non-transparent understanding. Accordingly, where 
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possible, divine understanding will be direct and transparent. Divine 
understanding is a non-propositional grasping of explanatory relations 
between things. In cases where the understanding is direct, the grasping is 
achieved via acquaintance with the very things that enter into the 
explanatory relations. In cases where the understanding is indirect, the 
grasping is achieved via acquaintance with some non-propositional mental 
representation of the explanatory connection. I can now present UVA: 
 
UVA 
For all true propositions <  p > , God knows that p iff God is acquainted 
ZLWKL*RG¶VEHOLHIWKDWpLL*RG¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHIDFWWKDWp; 
and (iii) the features of (ii) that explain the truth of (i). 
 
A note on the shape and ambition of UVA is in order. Along with 
mainstream epistemology, I assume that knowledge is justified true belief 
(JTB), plus some anti-Gettier condition (X). UVA should be taken as an 
account of what it takes for a case of knowledge (JTB+X) to be the best it 
can possibly be, epistemically speaking. Because of this, it is not a problem 
that divine knowledge is analysed in terms of something that provides a 
more demanding kind of cognitive contact with the world, namely 
understanding. Moreover, because I am taking understanding to be non-
propositional and distinct from knowledge, there is no risk of circularity in 
UVA. 
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In the following two sections, I will motivate UVA by showing that it 
captures the ideal epistemic position with respect to truths of different kinds. 
To help in this regard, I will assume two metaphysical theses. The first is 
presentism²the view that there are no past or future facts. The second is 
what I will call moderate determinism²that there are at least some truths 
about the future that have a definite truth value because the facts they 
purport to represent are causally determined by the present. I assume these 
theses not because I believe them, and not because my arguments hang on 
them, but because they make useful case-studies of truths about the present, 
SDVWDQGIXWXUH7DNLQJ7UDYLV0'LFNLQVRQ¶V9) account as a starting 
point, I will defend an account of divine knowledge of truths which 
represent existing facts with which it is possible to be acquainted²on 
presentism, facts about the present physical world. I will then argue that 
UVA is the best way of generalising this account to accommodate truths 
which represent facts which do not exist²on presentism and moderate 
determinism, truths about the past and future. 
I proceed in this way for two reasons. First, I aim to motivate my account 
of divine mathematical knowledge by showing that it falls out of a well-
motivated and general account of divine knowledge. It would certainly be 
more convenient to assume that the temporal and spatial extent of the 
SK\VLFDOXQLYHUVHLVµHWHUQDOO\SUHVHQW¶WR*RG:HFRXOGWKHQDFFRXQWIRU
DOORI*RG¶VNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSK\VLFDOZRUOGVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\LQWHUPVRI
*RG¶V DFTXDLQWDQFH ZLWK LW :KLOH WKLV ZRXOG VLPSOLI\ WKH DFFRXQW LWV
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plausibility would then be conditional on controversial metaphysical theses. 
By assuming presentism and moderate determinism, I provide an account 
RIGLYLQHNQRZOHGJHWKDWGRHVQ¶WDVVXPH*RG¶VDFTXDLQWDQFHZLWKDOOWKH
facts, and thus demonstrate that it has unconditional plausibility. Finally, 
DVVXPLQJ WKDW *RG LV QRW DFTXDLQWHG ZLWK DOO WKH IDFWV EULQJV *RG¶V
epistemic predicament closer to our own, honouring my assumption that 
divine knowledge is scrutable, and facilitating my explanation of the 
DFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDO beliefs. 
 
 
 Knowledge of the present 
 
 God is acquainted with all present physical objects, properties, and 
IDFWV$FFRUGLQJWR:LOOLDP$OVWRQWKLVUHQGHUV*RG¶VNQRZOHGJH
µLQIDOOLEOHLQDVWURQJVHQVH¶, 295), and so obviates the need to ascribe 
beliefs to God. However, Dickinson (2019FRQYLQFLQJO\DUJXHVWKDW*RG¶V
knowledge would be less perfect if it did not involve beliefs. His argument 
is that some kind of mental representation seems necessary for knowledge: 
 
[N]otice that we are all immediately aware of facts right now about 
ZKLFKZHKDYHQRWIRUPHGDQ\WKRXJKWVDERXWZKLFKZHKDYHQ¶W
conceptualized. One should consider a patch of colour in the 
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SHULSKHU\RIRQH¶VYLVXDO ILHOG RU WKHEX]]LQJRI OLJhts or of an 
electrical device), which one has not (until just now) noticed, 
though it has been there all along as an object of awareness. Though 
we were (by hypothesis) directly aware of them, these non-
conceptualized facts were not plausibly objects of knowledge since 
ZHGLGQ¶WHYHQQRWLFH WKHPRU IRUPDQ\ WKRXJKWV DERXW WKHP ,W
seems that it is in the forming of thoughts that these become 
possible objects of knowledge. (Dickinson (2019, 6)) 
 
*RG¶V DFTXDLQWDQFH ZLWK DOO WKH SUHVHQW SK\VLFDO IDFWV LV D SHrfection of 
*RG¶Vawareness; but without conceptual representation of these facts, it 
cannot amount to knowledge RIWKHVHIDFWV*RG¶VNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSUHVHQW
physical world involves having beliefs that represent all the present physical 
facts. This is an excellent epistemic state to be in with respect to truths about 
the present physical world. God not only believes all the true propositions; 
God is also acquainted with the parts of the world that make them true. As 
VXFK*RGµVHHVIRU*RGVHOI¶WKDWWKH\are true, and thus exercises maximum 
intellectual autonomy. However, this is not yet an ideal epistemic state. Two 
further ingredients are needed. 
The first Dickinson (2019, 10) recognises, and illustrates by example. 
Suppose one is confronted with with a mural filled with discrete spots that 
are randomly placed and of various sizes. Suppose there are exactly 1,242 
spots, each of which is in clear view. Suppose that the artist assures us that 
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there are 1,242 spots. We thus have the true belief that there are 1,242 spots, 
and we are acquainted with the fact that this belief truly represents. In this 
circumstance, perhaps we even know that there are 1,242 spots. 
Nevertheless, there is a better way of knowing that there are 1,242 spots. 
Imagine a similar mural that instead has just three spots. If we were to 
see this mural, we would not need to be told by the artist that there are three 
dots; we would on the basis of our perception be directly aware of the very 
feature of the perceived state of affairs that makes true the belief that there 
are three spots. In this case, we would be acquainted with our belief, and 
what it demands of the world for its truth; and we would be acquainted with 
the the very thing about the fact it represents that satisfies this demand. In 
'LFNLQVRQ¶V ZRUGV ZH ZRXOG EH DFTXDLQWHG ZLWK WKH correspondence 
between our belief and the fact it represents (2019, 10). This manner of 
speaking has the unfortunate connotation that we can be acquainted with a 
relation. Nevertheless, I will adopt it for convenience as shorthand for being 
acquainted with what enters into the correspondence, as described above. 
This is a better way of knowing that there are three spots. Being 
acquainted with why the represented fact makes the relevant proposition 
true aSSURSULDWHO\ JURXQGV RQH¶V MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU WKH EHOLHI LQ WKH WKLQJ
UHVSRQVLEOHIRULWVWUXWK,WDOLJQVRQH¶VLQWHUQDOMXVWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKHLGHDO
external justification. 
In the case where there are 1,242 spots, we are not in this position. Due 
to our cognitive limitations, we cannot see for ourselves that there are 1,242 
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spots. Thus, even though we have justification for our belief, it is not aligned 
with the ideal external justification, and so our belief is not appropriately 
grounded. Hence, there is a better way of knowing that there are 1,242 spots 
on the mural: being acquainted with our belief that there are 1,242 spots, 
being acquainted with the fact that there are 1,242 spots, and being 
acquainted with the correspondence between the fact that there are 1,242 
spots and <there are 1,242 spots>. Since God has no cognitive limitations, 
God knows that there are 1,242 spots on the mural by being acquainted with 
these three things. In fact, God knows all truths about the present physical 
world in this way. 
The final ingredient is a maximally rich understanding of the present 
physical facts. This will consist in acquaintance with the rich network of 
dependencies in which the fact represented by each true proposition is 
embedded. Again, talk of acquaintance with dependencies is to be 
understood as short hand for acquaintance with what enters into them. To 
return to our example, God will be acquainted with the rich network of 
dependencies in which the fact that there are 1,242 spots on the wall is 
embedded. God will be acquainted with the chemical composition of the 
paint, the molecular structure of the wall, the exact size and shape of every 
spot, and so on. In being thus acquainted, God knows precisely all the 
possible changes relevant to whether there are 1,242 spots on the wall. For 
example, God knows what it would take for the spots to fade or be removed, 
and God knows all the possible combinations (in terms of size and shape) 
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of spots compatible with there being 1,242 on the wall, and so on. We can 
now characterise divine knowledge of the present physical world as 
follows: 
 
UVAppw 
For all true propositions <  p >  concerning the present physical world, 
God knows that p LII*RGLVDFTXDLQWHGZLWKWKHIROORZLQJL*RG¶V
belief that pLL*RG¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRIWKHIDFWWKDWp; and (iii) 
the correspondence between the fact that p and (i). 
 
 
 Knowledge beyond the present 
 
 On presentism and moderate determinism, knowledge about the past 
and the future is knowledge of truths that represent no existing fact. We 
must generalise UVAppw so that it accounts for divine knowledge of such 
truths. Condition (i) need not be tampered with: belief is an intentional 
UHODWLRQ VR ZKHWKHU RU QRW D IDFW H[LVWV KDV QR HIIHFW RQ RXU RU *RG¶V
ability to believe the proposition that represents it. We can also leave 
condition (ii) alone, since understanding can be indirect, and thus achieved 
via acquaintance with a mental representation. However, (iii) requires that 
God be acquainted with the fact represented, so it must be suitably 
generalised. 
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Dickinson (2019, 12) attempts this by locating correspondence as an 
instance of a more general kind of cross-categorical entailment, holding 
between facts and true propositions²what he calls entailment*. According 
to Dickinson, a fact entails* <  p >  iff its obtaining guarantees <  p > ¶VWUXWK
7KHIRUFHRIµJXDUDQWHHV¶LVOHIWXQFOHDUEXW'LFNLQVRQLOOXVWUDWHVZLWKWKH
following example (2019, 12). The fact that Jones is in the room makes true 
the proposition that Jones is in the room, and this proposition in turn entails 
that someone is in the room. Dickinson takes the fact that Jones is in the 
room to entail* that someone is in the room. In this example, entailment* 
holds via a chain of truthmaking and entailment. A chain of relations is only 
as modally strong as its weakest link, and it is orthodoxy to take truthmaking 
to be metaphysically necessary (Merricks (2007, 5), Cameron (2008, 107), 
Shaffer (2008, 10), and Goff (2010); see Asay (2016) for arguments for the 
orthodoxy). So, I take it that entailment* is a metaphysically necessary 
relation, even if entailment requires something stronger. Thus, we can say 
that a fact entails* <  p >  iff <  p >  is true in all metaphysically possible 
worlds in which the fact obtains. 
In cases where <  p >  represents an existing fact, the fact that p clearly 
necessitates <  p > . After all, it is <  p > ¶Vtruthmaker. However, in cases 
where there is no existing fact, Dickinson (2019, 13) appeals to facts about 
God iQVWHDGQDPHO\*RG¶VSHUIHFWLRQ7KLV UDLVHVGLIILFXOWLHV7KHUH DUH
many different facts that necessitate a given truth. For example, suppose I 
have five million hairs on my body. Besides its truthmaker, the fact that 
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God believes the proposition presumably also necessitates that I have five 
million hairs on my body. So, if the condition is merely that God be 
acquainted with some fact or other that necessitates the truth of the relevant 
proposition, why in cases where there is a truthmaker is it acquaintance with 
WKH WUXWKPDNHU UDWKHU WKDQ*RG¶VSHUIHFWLRQ WKDW KHOSV FRQVWLWXWH*RG¶V
knowledge? Worse still, it looks as though, for a given necessary truth <  p 
> , God can know that p by virtue of being acquainted with any contingent 
fact, since <  p >  will be true in any metaphysically possible world in which 
that fact obtains. 
Being acquainted with the correspondence between the fact that p and 
< p >  is part of the ideal epistemic state with respect to knowing that p, not 
just because being so acquainted necessitates the truth of the belief that p, 
but also because the corresponding fact explains the truth of the belief. As 
DPD[LPDOO\YLUWXRXVNQRZHU*RGZLOOZKHUHSRVVLEOHµVHHLWIRU*RGVHOI¶
E\EHDFTXDLQWHGZLWKWKHIDFWWKDWH[SODLQVWKHWUXWKRI*RG¶s beliefs. 
:KDWGRHVµVHHLQJLWIRU*RGVHOI¶DPRXQWWRZKHQWKHUHLVQRH[LVWLQJ
fact represented? Recall that understanding a fact is being acquainted with 
the tapestry of dependencies in which it is embedded. On presentism and 
moderate determinism, past facts no longer exist, but can have effects in the 
present, and future facts do not exist yet, but some have causal antecedents 
in the present. Acquaintance with these present facts can furnish a 
sufficiently rich understanding. 
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To illustrate, suppose it is true that the sun will rise on 19/02/2060. By 
hypothesis, the corresponding fact does not yet exist, but plausibly certain 
present facts ensure that it will: the laws governing planetary motion in our 
solar system, the mass of the earth, and so on. Being acquainted with these 
facts, grasping how they hang together and conspire to bring about the fact 
that the sun will rise on the 19/02/2060, is to have a maximally rich 
understanding of this fact. 
If God believes sun will rise on 19/02/2060 because God is acquainted 
ZLWK WKLV IDFW¶V FDXVDO DQWHFHGHQWV WKHQ *RG¶V EHOLHI LV QHFHVVDULO\ WUXH
There is a relation between the facts that causally determine the fact that the 
VXQZLOOULVHRQDQGWKHWUXWKRI*RG¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHVXQZLOO
rise on 19/02/2060, such that the former explains the latter. Being 
DFTXDLQWHG ZLWK WKLV UHODWLRQ DOLJQV *RG¶V LQWHUQDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH
ideal external justification. God knows all causally determined future facts 
in this way.10 
We turn now to truths about truths concerning the past. The sun rose on 
19/02/1989. By hypothesis, the corresponding fact no longer exists. 
However, there are present facts which would not obtain, had the sun not 
risen on 19/02/1989. For example, the sun would not have risen today, and 
GoG ZRXOG QRW UHPHPEHU LW ULVLQJ RQ  LI LW KDGQ¶W KDSSHQHG
Thus, a sufficiently rich understanding of the fact that the sun rose on 
19/02/1989 is achievable via acquaintance with the present facts that 
GHSHQGRQLWVKDYLQJREWDLQHG*RG¶VSHUIHFWLon, and the immutability of 
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causal laws, means the existence of these causal consequences necessitates 
that the relevant fact obtained. Further, the existence of these consequences 
H[SODLQVWKHWUXWKRI*RG¶VEHOLHI%HLQJDFTXDLQWHGZLWKWKLVH[SODQDWRU\
UHODWLRQ DOLJQV *RG¶V MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU WKH EHOLHI ZLWK WKH LGHDO H[WHUQDO
justification. 
We have seen that we can generalise the third condition in UVAppw to 
accommodate truths representing non-existent facts by restating it in terms 
RI*RG¶VJUDVSLQJZKDWH[SODLQVWKHWUXWKRI*RG¶VEHOLHI7KXV89$LVDQ
adequate generalised characterisation of divine knowledge: 
 
UVA 
For all true propositions <  p > , God knows that p iff God is acquainted 
ZLWK WKH IROORZLQJ WKUHH WKLQJV L *RG¶V EHOLHI WKDW p LL *RG¶V
understanding of the fact that p; and (iii) the features of (ii) that 
explain the truth of (i). 
 
 
 Knowledge of the third kind 
 
 Mathematical facts cannot be the objects of acquaintance. 
Mathematical objects are causally inert, so they cannot be the objects of 
human perception. But why assume that God cannot be acquainted with 
them? Because, for God to be acquainted with them, mathematical objects 
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must enter into a relation whereby God is directly aware of them. This 
relation cannot be causation; but it must be causation-like, since the 
PDWKHPDWLFDOREMHFWVPXVWLQVRPHVHQVHLPSLQJHRQ*RG¶VFRJQLWLRQ6R
*RG¶V DFTXDLQWDQFH ZLWK WKH PDWKHPDWLFDO IDFWV UHTXLUHV D sui generis 
relation that is like causation, apart from its incompatibility with platonism. 
:H PLJKW FDOO WKLV µVXSHUQDWXUDO FDXVDWLRQ¶ 3RVLWLQJ WKLV UHODWLRQ UDLVHV
three problems.  
)LUVWLWYLRODWHVWKHVSLULWRISODWRQLVPFDOOLQJWKHUHODWLRQµVXSHUQDWXUDO
FDXVDWLRQ¶VHUYHVRQO\WRSUHVerve the letter (see Baras (2017, 485-486)). I 
am not merely trying to provide a legal explanation; I am trying to provide 
one that platonists might find attractive, so long as they countenance the 
existence of God. For this reason, positing supernatural causation seems 
like a bad idea. Second, positing supernatural causation violates the 
assumption that divine knowledge is scrutable, and thus undermines my aim 
RIUHSO\LQJWR)LHOG¶VREMHFWLRQ7KHQRWLRQRIVXSHUQDWXUDOFDXVDWLRQLVD
sui generis one that is beyond our ken, so appealing to it in characterising 
divine mathematical knowledge would destroy our understanding of this 
aspect of divine knowledge, and along with it any hope of explaining the 
DFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIV 
We have so far considered two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of truths 
that represent existing facts with which acquaintance is possible; and 
knowledge of truths which represent non-existing facts. Mathematical 
knowledge is knowledge of a third kind: knowledge of truths that represent 
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existing facts with which acquaintance is not possible. Following UVA, the 
WDVNDWKDQGLV WRORFDWHZKDW*RG¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPDWKHPDWLFDOIDFWV
involves, and the facts with which God can be acquainted that explain the 
WUXWKRI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIV 
As with other domains, I will treat divine mathematical knowledge as 
not fundamentally different from, but an ideal version of, human 
mathematical knowledge. Broadly speaking, there are two sources of 
human mathematical knowledge, and so two sources of divine 
mathematical knowledge: extra- and intra-mathematical. 
 
Extra-mathematical: Our best scientific theories indispensably involve 
apparent reference to and quantification over mathematical objects. The 
empirical evidence for these theories gives us reason to think they are true, 
and thus gives us reason to think that mathematical objects exist. So runs 
the indispensability argument for platonism (attributed to Quine (1948) and 
Putnam (1971)). 
Things have come a long way since Quine and Putnam. Field (1980) 
attempted to show that science can be done without mathematics. While his 
project was impressive and enlightening, most now consider it doomed (see 
Macbride (1999) for an excellent survey), conceding that mathematics is 
LQGLVSHQVDEOH WR VFLHQFH +RZHYHU WKH VSLULW RI )LHOG¶V REMHFWLRQ²that 
mathematics is not confirmed by its role in science²lives on. Several 
theorists (e.g. Leng (2010), (2012); Melia (2000); Yablo (2012)) argue that 
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mathematics merely serves to represent physical things that could not 
otherwise be represented. 
In response, platonists appeal to cases where scientists apparently appeal 
to the properties of mathematical objects to explain physical phenomena 
(see note 4 for references). According to these theorists, such examples 
provide prima facie evidence for the explanatory thesis and thus platonism. 
This is where contemporary platonists look for external justification for 
platonism. 
God has a maximally rich understanding of the physical facts. On 
platonism, mathematical objects are explanatorily relevant to the physical 
facts, so, in having a perfect understanding of the physical facts, God must 
grasp how the mathematical facts help determine the physical facts. This 
also facilitates understanding for the mathematical facts themselves, via 
grasping the dependencies into which they enter. 
,QDVHQVH,¶PFODLPLQJWKDWPDWKHPDWLFVLVH[SODQDWRU\LQGLVSHQVDEOH
WR*RG¶VWKHRU\RIWKHSK\VLFDOZRUOGVRRQHPLJKWZRUU\WKDW,DPSUH-
judging the outcome of the ongoing debate described above. I am not. I 
repeat: the debate concerns the existence of a certain kind of evidence: 
whether our current best science explains physical phenomena by appeal to 
the properties of mathematical objects. However this debate turns out, 
platonism, as I have characterised it, assumes that there is an explanatory 
connection between mathematical objects and the physical world. Thus, an 
ideal understanding of the physical world will involve a grasping this 
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connection. This is compatible with the possibility that our best 
understanding of the physical world merely draws on mathematics as a tool 
for representing purely physical dependencies. 
 
Intra-mathematical: Some mathematical truths strike us as immediately 
obvious of their respective domains. These intuitions form part of the 
support we claim for our axiomatic mathematical theories: a minimum 
requirement for a mathematical theory is that it saves at least a substantial 
range of our mathematical intuitions. Beyond that, axioms are justified to 
the extent that they exhibit certain theoretical virtues. As far as possible, 
they should strike us as obvious and distinctive of their domain. But they 
should facilitate proofs of interesting and useful theorems beyond those of 
which we are already convinced, perhaps shedding new light on other 
domains²they should be fruitful. By maximising such virtues, a system of 
axioms earns the status of being part of the best systematisation of our 
mathematical intuitions. Less obvious mathematical claims are then 
justified by being entailed by the axioms. 
Sometimes, theoretical virtues pull in different directions, so the task is 
to find the best overall balance. Take the following axioms characterising 
the rules of addition for the real numbers: 
 
 
A1: For all x,y א Ⴆ, x + y א Ⴆ. 
A2: For all x,y,z א Ⴆ, (y + x) + z = x + (y + z). 
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A3: For all x,y א Ⴆ, x + y = y + x. 
A4: There is a number 0 א Ⴆ such that x + 0 = x = 0 + x for all x א Ⴆ. 
A5: For each x א Ⴆ, there is a number íx) א Ⴆ such that x íx) = 0 = 
 íx) + x. 
 
 
A1 through A5 are obvious: they make explicit things implicit in our 
concept of number. However, they do not capture anything distinctive of 
the real numbers, and they are not fruitful with respect to the real numbers. 
To address this, we might include the completeness axiom, with the help of 
the following definitions. If S is a set of real numbers, then S is bounded 
above iff there is some N such that x N for all x א S. The supremum of a 
set S is the least upper bound of S; that is, the smallest number N such that, 
for all x א S, x N. 
 
 
A6: Every non-empty set of real numbers which is bounded above has  
 a supremum. 
 
 
A6 is less obvious; its status as an axiom is justified by its capturing 
something distinctive about its domain²WKDWWKHUHDUHQ¶WDQ\µJDSV¶²and 
its fruitfulness. For example, it allows us to prove the pre-theoretically 
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compelling Archimedean property that, given any real number x, there is an 
integer n such that n >  x. 
*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVZLOOEHSHUIHFWO\V\VWHPDWLVHG*RGJUDVSV
axiomatic propositions that capture obvious and distinctive truths about the 
PDWKHPDWLFDOREMHFWVSUHVXSSRVHGLQ*RG¶VXnderstanding of the physical 
world, while ensuring maximal fruitfulness. This will, of course, rely on 
*RG¶VMXGJHPHQWVDERXWWKHEHVWRYHUDOOEDODQFHRIWKHRUHWLFDOYLUWXHV*RG
will also immediately see all the deductive consequences of these axioms. 
Thus, all of the mathematical truths will strike God as immediately obvious. 
7RLOOXVWUDWHWKHVHQVHLQZKLFK*RGFDQµVHH¶DOORIWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI
*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVFRQVLGHUDFDVHZKHUHRXURZQDELOLW\WRVHH
consequences fails: 
 
 
 
 
The first of these says that, as n tends to infinity,  tends to 1. This is 
immediately obvious. We can see that, as n gets larger and larger,  gets 
closer and closer to 0, and so  gets closer and closer to 1. The second, 
however, is less obvious. We might be tempted to think that, since  
tends to 1 as n tends to infinity and 1n = 1 for any tends to 1 as n 
tends to infinity. This intuition is due to a failure to see the incremental 
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effect of increasing the exponent as the denominator of the fraction inside 
the parentheses is increased. It is due to a limitation in our cognitive 
capacities. God, however, is able to immediately see the incremental effect 
of increasing the exponent. 
We must now identify the facts with which God can be acquainted that 
expODLQWKHWUXWKRI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIV*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIV
DUHGHULYHGDEGXFWLYHO\WKH\DUHIRUPHGDVSDUWRI*RG¶VEHVW-systematised 
explanation of the physical world. The truth of abductively derived 
conclusions are determined by two things: the truth of the premises; and the 
abductive judgements on the basis of which the conclusions are derived. In 
this case, the premises are the explananda: the physical facts to be 
H[SODLQHG*RGLVDFTXDLQWHGZLWKWKHVH$QG*RGLVDFTXDLQWHGZLWK*RG¶V
abductive judgements on the basis of which the mathematical conclusions 
DUH GHULYHG %XW KRZ GR WKHVH LQJUHGLHQWV H[SODLQ WKH WUXWK RI *RG¶V
PDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIV"%HFDXVH*RGLVDSHUIHFWHSLVWHPLFDJHQWVR*RG¶V
judgements cannot err. 
I close this section by dealing with two possible objections. First, 
abductive judgements provide at best defeasible justification. So, abductive 
judgements cannot necessitate the truth of the beliefs derived from them. 
%XW LI *RG¶V DEGXFWLYH MXGJHPHQWV cannot err, then God¶V DEGXFWLYH
judgements do necessitate the truth of the beliefs derived from them. So, the 
H[SODQDWLRQRI WKH WUXWK RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDO EHOLHIV LV RQH ZH FDQQRW
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make sense of, violating my commitment to the scrutability of divine 
knowledge. 
To reply, I will attempt to flesh out the notion of a perfect epistemic 
DJHQW LQ WKH KRSH RI PDNLQJ VHQVH RI WKH LGHD WKDW *RG¶V DEGXFWLYH
judgements cannot err. Here is one way to go.11 We start with an equation, 
GHULYHGIURP%D\HV¶7KHRUHPVHH(DUPDQ(2000)), which runs informally 
as follows. Suppose we have a group of witnesses. For each witness: the 
likelihood that they will judge p true is more likely when p is true than when 
p is false²the witnesses are relatively reliable; and the likelihood that each 
witness judges p true is not made more or less likely than any of the other 
ZLWQHVV¶VMXGJHPHQWV²the witnesses are independent. Then, as the number 
of witnesses judging p true approaches infinity, the probability that p is true 
tends to 1. We can then take the perfect epistemic agent, God, to be one that 
satisfies the following. Let n be the number of relatively reliable and 
independent witnesses. Then, for any value of n, the probability of p being 
true given that God judges p true is greater than the probability of p being 
true given that each witness judges p true. It follows that, for any p, the 
probability that p is true given that God judges p true is arbitrarily close to 
1. And this applies to abductive and non-abductive judgements alike. In this 
way, we can PDNHVHQVHRIWKHLGHDWKDW*RG¶VDEGXFWLYHMXGJHPHQWVFDQQRW
err. 
The second objection is that the idea of God deriving mathematical 
beliefs via abductive judgements about the physical world is hard to 
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UHFRQFLOHZLWK*RG¶VFUHDWLYHSRZHU*RGLVVXSSRVHGto have created the 
physical universe. So, if the physical universe is one way rather than another 
because certain mathematical facts obtain, and if God has no control over 
which mathematical facts obtain, then God would have bumped up against 
the mathematical facts in creating the universe. My response is to point at 
WKDWZKHQ,VD\WKDW*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVDUHGHULYHGYLDDEGXFWLYH
judgements about the physical world, I do not mean to suggest that God 
surveyed the physical world, then wondered why it is the way it is, then 
LQIHUUHG*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVDVWKHEHVWH[SODQDWLRQ5DWKHU,PHDQ
WRVD\WKDW*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVDUHUDWLRQDOO\JURXQGHGLQDEGXFWLYH
judgements regarding the physical world. I make no claims about the 
aetiology RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIV,DPRSHQWRWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW
*RGIRUPHG*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVZKLOHFUHDWLQJWKHXQLYHUVH 
 
 
 A supernaturalistic explanation 
 
 We are at last in a position to see how theistic platonism avoids 
)LHOG¶VREMHFWLRQ 7RGRVRZHPXVWILUVWUHSO\WR%DUDV¶VREMHFWLRQWKDWWKH
DFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHG)RU%DUDV¶V
REMHFWLRQWRLQKHULWWKHGLDOHFWLFDOIRUFHRI)LHOG¶VLWPXVWWDNHWKHIRUPRI
D GHEXQNLQJ DUJXPHQW )LHOG¶V REMHFWLRQ SURvides a reason for rejecting 
platonism while granting the justification claimed for the view. Platonism 
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yields an explanatory debt that we have principled reasons to believe cannot 
EHVHWWOHGDQGWKLVµWHQGVWRXQGHUPLQHWKHEHOLHILQPDWKHPDWLFDOHQWLWLHs, 
GHVSLWHZKDWHYHUUHDVRQZHPLJKWKDYHIRUEHOLHYLQJLQWKHP¶, 26). 
Thus, Baras must allow the theistic platonist to appeal to the resources 
available to her, and grant the defeasible justification claimed for her view. 
But this means granting the legitimacy of the kinds of supernaturalistic 
explanations that theists indulge in, and take to support their view. For 
H[DPSOHWKHLVWVWHQGWRWKLQNWKDW*RG¶VFUHDWLQJWKHXQLYHUVHLVWKHEHVW
explanation for its existence. This is an explanation that appeals to the 
properties of a supernatural entity²a supernaturalistic explanation. This 
UHYHDOV WKDW LW LV OHJLWLPDWH WR DQVZHU %DUDV¶V REMHFWLRQ E\ SURYLGLQJ D
VXSHUQDWXUDOLVWLF H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH DFFXUDF\ RI *RG¶V PDWKHPDWLFDO
beliefs; that is, one that appeals to the properties of God. 
6XFKDQH[SODQDWLRQIDOOVRXWRI89$*RG¶VSHUIHFWLRQDVDQHSLVWHPLF
DJHQWDGHTXDWHO\H[SODLQVWKHDFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDl beliefs. We 
saw WKDW WKH UDWLRQDO JURXQGV RI *RG¶V PDWKHPDWLFDO EHOLHIV DUH *RG¶V
abductive MXGJHPHQWV 6LQFH *RG LV D SHUIHFW HSLVWHPLF DJHQW *RG¶V
DEGXFWLYHMXGJHPHQWVFDQQRWHUU7KXV*RG¶VSHUIHFWLRQDVDQHSLVWHPLF
DJHQW DGHTXDWHO\ H[SODLQV WKH DFFXUDF\ RI *RG¶V PDWKHPDWLFDO EHOLHIV
Moreover, this explanation in terms of UVA is not mere speculation. We 
saw that UVA can account for divine knowledge of a variety of different 
kinds of truth, and is not hostage to the nature of time and causation. UVA 
is an independently-supported general account of divine knowledge, and 
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this support is transferred to the explanation of divine mathematical 
knowledge that falls out of it. From this firm footing, we can move on to 
explain the accuracy of our own mathematical beliefs, and thus respond to 
)LHOG¶VREMHFWLRQE\FODLPLQJWKDW*RGPDGHVXUHLQFUHDWLng us that our 
own abductive judgements would not lead us astray. 
Herein lies the crucial difference between theistic and atheistic 
platonism. On atheism, our abductive judgements are, for all we know, not 
only sensitive to the way the world really is. This is especially true in the 
case of mathematics, where we have no causal feedback from the domain 
of investigation. Our judgements may be a guide to what best allows limited 
cognitive creatures like ourselves to navigate the world; but this is as much 
to do with our own cognitive limitations and idiosyncrasies as it is with how 
the world really is. By contrast, on theism, God ensures that our judgements 
SURGXFHDFFXUDWHPDWKHPDWLFDOEHOLHIVDQG*RG¶VSHUIHFWLRQHQVXUHVWKDW
*RG¶VMXGJHPHQWVUDWLRQDOO\JURXnd accurate mathematical beliefs. 
Did I need to provide a theory of divine mathematical knowledge to 
PDNH WKLV FDVH" &RXOGQ¶W , KDYH MXVW DSSHDOHG WR *RG¶V RPQLVFLHQFH WR
H[SODLQ WKH DFFXUDF\ RI *RG¶V PDWKHPDWLFDO EHOLHIV" 1R 7KLV VLPSOHU
explanation raises a question of explanatory priority: is God omniscient 
because God knows all the truths, or does God know all the truths because 
*RG LV RPQLVFLHQW" ,I WKH IRUPHU WKHQ RQH FDQQRW DSSHDO WR *RG¶V
perfection to explain WKHDFFXUDF\RI*RG¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOEHliefs, since the 
explanatory priority runs the wrong way. Having motivated an account of 
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divine mathematical knowledge independently, I can settle this issue in a 
principled manner. On my account of divine mathematical knowledge, 
*RG¶VSHUIHFWDEGXFWLYHMXGJHPHQWVSURYLGHWKHUDWLRQDOJURXQGVIRU*RG¶V
mathematical beliefs in a way that explains their accuracy. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 , KDYH VKRZQ KRZ WKHLVWLF SODWRQLVP FDQ UHSO\ WR )LHOG¶V
epistemological objection to mathematical platonism. My reply is premised 
on a God whose knowledge is not fundamentally different from our own. 
The epistemology of divine mathematics parallels contemporary platonist 
thought about the epistemology of human mathematics. This, I hope, 
renders the overall package attractive to contemporary platonists. 
0RUHRYHULWVKHGVVRPHOLJKWRQ)LHOG¶VLQIOXHQWLDOREMHFWLRQWKDW ,KRSH
atheistic philosophers of mathematics will find interesting. We saw that it 
ZDV WKH IDFW WKDW *RG¶V DEGXFWLYH MXGJHPHQWV FDQQRW HUU WKDW XOWLPDWHO\
explained thH DFFXUDF\ RI *RG¶V PDWKHPDWLFDO EHOLHIV ,Q FRQWUDVW RQ
atheism, human abductive judgements may tell us more about our 
OLPLWDWLRQV WKDQ WKH\ WHOO XV DERXW UHDOLW\ 7R UHSO\ WR )LHOG¶V REMHFWLRQ
without appeal to God, we must locate something about the kinds of 
abductive judgements from which our mathematical beliefs are derived that 
explains the truth of our mathematical beliefs. 
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 Notes 
 
1. See Linnebo (2018) for more on platonism, and Shapiro (2000, 201±225) for 
an excellent introduction to the contemporary debate. 
2. The former example is from Lange (2017); the latter is critically discussed in 
Leng (2012). 
3. See Lyon (2012), Pincock (2015), and Baron et al. (2017) for a menagerie of 
accounts. 
4. See Baker (2005), (2016a), (2016b); Baker and Colyvan (2011); Bangu 
(2013); Baron (2014); Colyvan (2002), (2010), (2012); Lyon (2012); Lyon and 
Colyvan (2008). These authors argue for platonism by appeal to prima facie 
cases of mathematical explanation in science, so their platonism is one that 
includes the explanatory thesis. 
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5. An anonymous referee points out that there are other ways to account for the 
value of mathematics that do not presuppose the explanatory thesis. One is to 
claim that mathematics is a powerful deductive tool, enabling us to deduce 
non-mathematical conclusions from non-mathematical premises more 
HIILFLHQWO\WKDQZHZRXOGEHDEOHWRZLWKRXWLWDVFRQWHQGHGE\)LHOG¶V(1980) 
programme and its followers). Another is to claim that, as well as helping with 
deductions, mathematics offers a rich framework of concepts for representing 
the physical world DVFRQWHQGHGE\µHDV\-URDGQRPLQDOLVWV¶HJ Leng (2010); 
Melia (2000)). I agree with the referee that these theses are available to the 
platonist. (Indeed, Brown (2012) is a platonist who ascribes to something like 
the easy-road view.) Nevertheless, there are two reasons why they would fail 
to provide an adequate platonist account of the value of mathematics. First, 
they are not really accounts of the value of mathematics; they are accounts of 
the utility of mathematics in science. What we want is an account of why 
mathematics itself is valuable. Second, these accounts were originally 
advanced in support of anti-platonism, so they assign no role whatsoever to 
mathematical facts or our cognitive contact with them. Thus, on a form of 
platonism that subscribes to one of these views, the value of mathematics 
would be an epiphenomenon, arising out of the fact that ascertaining 
mathematical facts involves considerable theoretical ingenuity; the 
ascertaining of the mathematical facts would not in and of itself be valuable. 
In contrast, commitment to the explanatory thesis renders the ascertaining of 
mathematical facts valuable because the facts themselves are deeply important 
aspects of reality. 
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6. )LHOG¶V REMHFWLRQ  25± LPSURYHV RQ %HQDFHUUDI¶V  E\ QRW
relying on a particular theory of knowledge. 
7. See Liggins (2018) for an interpretation of Field along these lines. As Liggins 
(2018, 1030) does, I note that the objection Clarke-Doane addresses does echo 
later statements RI)LHOG¶VVHHHJ)LHOG 81). All I claim is that this is 
not the objection that Field originally presented. See Warren (2017) for a 
presentation and defence of the reliability objection. 
8. I follow Fumerton (1995), (2001), who takes acquaintance to be a sui generis 
relation of direct awareness that cannot be analysed into any more familiar 
concepts (1995, 76). In contrast, Bonjour (2003) takes acquaintance to be an 
intrinsic, non-relational property of conscious states. Nothing of relevance 
hangs on this difference: my account is compatible with either notion of 
acquaintance. See Hasan and Fumerton (2017) for more on acquaintance. 
9. While the nature of pain is debated, what I have said seems broadly agreed 
upon by perceptual theorists. Nevertheless, I only appeal to pain to help 
illustrate the notion of acquaintance. See Murat (2013) for more on pain. 
10. What DERXWWKHIXWXUHWKDWLVQ¶WFDXVDOO\GHWHUPLQHG":HZRXOGKDYHWRFODLP
that there are no truths about such things for God to know. However, God is 
not clueless about such things. Propositions concerning the uncertain future 
have a certain probability of being true, given present facts, and God will have 
knowledge of these probabilities. This will fall short of knowledge of what 
will happen in these cases, but I think this is the best we can do consistent with 
the assumption that divine knowledge is scrutable. 
11. 7KLVDSSURDFK LV LQVSLUHGE\6FKLQGOHU¶VUHFHQWGHIHQFHRIVFLHQWLILF
realism. 
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